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Deconstructing the Relationship between Entrepreneurial Orientation 
and Business Performance at the Embryonic Stage of Firm Growth 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Studies of entrepreneurial orientation tend to examine its three most common features only (risk-
taking, innovativeness, and proactiveness), merging these into a gestalt construct of 
entrepreneurial orientation and then analyzing its effect on business performance.  This is in 
contrast to Lumpkin and Dess who stressed an entrepreneurial orientation is best characterized 
by five dimensions which can vary independently and may not be equally valuable across 
performance metrics or at different stages of development.  We rectify these problems by 
examining the independent impact of risk-taking, innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive 
aggressiveness, and autonomy on performance of young high-technology firms at an embryonic 
stage of development.  Our results support those Lumpkin and Dess.  Only proactiveness and 
innovativeness have a positive influence on business performance while risk-taking has a 
negative relationship.  Competitive aggressiveness and autonomy appear to hold no business 
performance value at this stage of firm growth.  From these results, we offer implications for 
managers in addition to guidance for future research. 
 
Keywords:  Entrepreneurial orientation; risk-taking, innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive 
aggressiveness, autonomy, young firms; business performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Today’s business environment is repeatedly described as complex and uncertain (Dreyer 
and Grønhaug, 2004; Slater and Olson, 2002).  This can place emerging young firms in 
vulnerable positions by compromising their ability to compete against established competitors.  
To compete under such conditions, normative theory encourages young firms to hone their 
entrepreneurial capabilities (Lee, Lee, and Pennings, 2001; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005) so as 
to launch speedy and stealthy attacks on rivals (Chen and Hambrick, 1995).   
 Seminal work by Lumpkin and Dess (1996) defined an entrepreneurial orientation (EO) 
as the decision-making styles, processes, and methods that inform a firm’s entrepreneurial 
activities.  It has also been described as a form of strategic orientation (Wiklund and Shepherd, 
2003, 2005).  Lumpkin and Dess (1996) drew on extensive research to characterize an EO as 
being the product of five dimensions—risk-taking, innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive 
aggressiveness, and autonomy.  Research efforts since then have repeatedly sought to prove that 
EO carries valuable rewards in terms of business performance.  Several studies have reported 
positive associations (e.g., Wiklund, 1999; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003, 2005; Zahra, 1991; 
Zahra and Covin, 1995) but there are exceptions to this (e.g., Hart, 1992; Matsuno, Mentzer, and 
Özsomer, 2002; Morgan and Strong, 2003; Smart and Conant, 1994; Slevin and Covin, 1990).  It 
would appear that EO sometimes, but not always, contributes to improved business performance. 
 The important question, therefore, is why the influence of EO on performance might be 
so inconsistent.  Despite the wide-ranging attention devoted to EO, few studies have expressly 
examined Lumpkin and Dess’ (1996) five-dimension framework of EO.  The tendency has been 
instead to study only three of the five dimensions, commonly risk-taking, innovativeness, and 
proactiveness as characterized by Miller (1983).  Moreover, researchers have almost exclusively 
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adopted an aggregate (or higher-order) approach to the assessment of EO.  That is, risk-taking, 
innovativeness, and proactiveness are measured as independent dimensions and then a composite 
EO scale is created into a combined gestalt construct for further analysis.  The problem with this 
approach is that it neglects the individual influence of each dimension and assumes a universal 
and uniform influence by each dimension.  In contrast, Lumpkin and Dess (1996) state that each 
dimension can vary independently and might not necessarily be beneficial or even desirable at 
different points in time.  As a result, the coarse-grained conclusions from much of the extant EO 
empirical research require that this fundamental caveat be explored further. 
 For emerging young firms with limited resource endowments, understanding which of the 
five EO dimensions are most valuable to securing improved performance at their potentially 
vulnerable stage of development is an important priority.  It is conceivable that all five 
dimensions may be beneficial but it is equally plausible that only a sub-set of dimensions may be 
valuable.  At present, research into EO has ignored these issues and instead has consistently only 
made only a partial analysis of the Lumpkin and Dess (1996) framework and have adopted a 
summative approach to their examination of EO, which renders individual uniqueness obsolete.  
We seek to contribute to our understanding of the EO construct by rectifying these omissions and 
responding to the following research question: Are all five dimensions of the Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996) EO framework equally valuable to firms at an embryonic stage of development? 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study differs from the majority of existing studies in that it examines the relationship 
between EO and performance at the uni-dimensional level in emerging young firms in order to 
assess specifically which dimensions of EO are most valuable to securing performance at that 
embryonic stage of development.  To further differentiate from extant studies, we examine the 
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EO construct as specified by the conceptualization of Lumpkin and Dess (1996), rather than 
merely adopt a selective approach to the analysis of EO. 
 The majority of studies into EO tend to adopt the Miller (1983) definition of an 
entrepreneurial firm and extrapolate it to EO.  Miller (1983) defined an entrepreneurial firm as 
one that “engages in product market innovation, undertakes somewhat risky ventures, and is first 
to come up with ‘proactive’ innovations, beating competitors to the punch” (p. 771).  From this 
definition, scholars have repeatedly pinpointed and studied three core dimensions said to classify 
an EO these being risk-taking, innovativeness and proactiveness (e.g., Barringer and Bluedorn, 
1999; Covin and Slevin, 1989; Naman and Slevin, 1993; Wiklund, 1999; Wiklund and Shepherd, 
2003, 2005; Zahra and Covin, 1995).  Lumpkin and Dess (1996) on the other hand argue that a 
coherent classification of an EO consists of five dimensions not three.  In addition to those 
identified by Miller (1983), Lumpkin and Dess (1996) conceptualize competitive aggressiveness 
and autonomy as two additional dimensions of a coherent EO. 
 Lumpkin and Dess (1996) define EO as the methods, practices, and decision-making 
styles managers use to act entrepreneurially and can be thought of as a type of strategic 
orientation insofar as it captures how a firm intends to compete.  An EO is operationalized 
through risk-taking, innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness, and autonomy 
each of which can vary independently (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  Risk-taking reflects an 
acceptance of uncertainty and risk inherent in original activity and is typically characterized by 
resource commitment to uncertain outcomes and activities.  Innovativeness captures a bias 
toward embracing and supporting creativity and experimentation, technological leadership, 
novelty and R&D in the development of products, services and processes.  Proactiveness relates 
to a forward-looking perspective where companies actively seek to anticipate opportunities to 
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develop and introduce new products to obtain first-mover advantages and shape the direction of 
the environment.  Competitive aggressiveness conveys the intensity with which a firm chooses to 
compete and attempts to surpass competitors reflecting a bias toward out-maneuvering and out-
doing rivals.  Autonomy describes giving an individual or team within the firm the necessary 
authority and independence to develop business concepts and visions and carry them through to 
completion.   
 As yet, it is largely unclear how these five dimensions individually map onto business 
performance.  It is evident that all or at least a combination of dimensions exhibit some 
relationship with business performance since there have been widespread reports of a positive 
relationship between EO and performance (e.g., Wiklund, 1999; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003, 
2005; Zahra, 1991; Zahra and Covin, 1995).  Yet some dimensions might ‘carry’ others that may 
have no separate influence on performance.  This appears a likely possibility because the EO–
performance relationship has been called into question in several studies with a number finding 
little or no association and others reporting even a negative relationship (e.g., Hart, 1992; 
Matsuno et al., 2002; Morgan and Strong, 2003; Smart and Conant, 1994). 
Studies have ignored an analysis of the EO dimensions and as such we have little 
knowledge of whether each is equally important or even necessary to secure improved 
performance in emerging young firms.  Lumpkin and Dess (1996) reasoned that EO dimensions 
might lead to favorable outcomes on one performance dimension but unfavorable outcomes on 
another and this may also depend on different firm conditions.  These authors further suggested 
that as firms change, the nature of their EO might change with it.  Age and size determine much 
of firms’ needs and Lumpkin and Dess (1996) highlighted that very young firms might exhibit 
dependency on innovativeness and risk-taking, for example, more than older and larger firms 
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which may require greater autonomy to achieve improved performance.  They further raise the 
question of when a firm might cease to be entrepreneurial but go on to suggest that rather than 
appearing to cease, the case may be that the firm’s EO changes to better suit its strategic and 
market needs.  They conclude that not all EO dimensions may be present or valuable as it 
depends on firm context.  From these issues, to advance the Lumpkin and Dess (1996) 
framework, it is clear that research is needed to examine how each individual dimension of an 
EO might influence business performance, and, it is necessary to take into account the stage of 
development of firms to be examined.  Accordingly, in the context of this study, emerging young 
firms may implement each dimension of EO simultaneously without any degree of certainty as to 
a possible business performance effect.  The next section will explore each dimension in turn and 
hypothesize why a specific dimension might have a positive influence on business performance 
in emerging young firms. 
HYPOTHESES 
 Risk-taking represents a willingness to commit resources to implement projects, 
activities, and solutions that contain inherently a high level of uncertainty regarding the likely 
outcomes (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  When deciding to take risks, firms must tolerate one of 
two possible scenarios—the first being the risk of failing and second the risk of missing out on 
an opportunity (Dickson and Giglierano, 1986).  The former is caused by fear whereas the latter 
is caused by inaction.  A tolerance of risk-taking orients the firm toward action and induces it to 
embrace uncertainty.  Timely risk-taking has been associated with strategic decision speed and 
both have subsequently been linked to improved business performance (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Without a degree of risk-taking, firms delay or refrain from introducing innovations, from 
undertaking exploitative activities and react conservatively to changing market conditions.  The 
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result would be weaker performance as the firm would do little to seize customer and market 
opportunities. 
 Risk-oriented firms combine opportunity-seeking behavior with constructive risk-taking 
to generate a bias for exploration and exploitation (Baird and Thomas, 1996; Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996).  This prevents the firm from being lulled into inertia, inaction, and adherence to traditions 
(Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Miller and Friesen, 1982).  Risk-taking managements usually seize 
opportunities and make commitments of resources before fully understanding what action needs 
to betaken (Covin and Slevin, 1991).  Such an approach seeks to take advantage of evolving 
situations by capitalizing on the fact that markets rarely stabilize for any length of time.  Risk 
aversion renders firms passive to developing new market opportunities which is likely to 
deteriorate performance in age of rapid change (Miller and Friesen, 1982). 
 Risk-taking can carry costs but where customer demands change incessantly, the thrust of 
research opinion suggests that firms need to demonstrate a willingness to take risks and 
challenge the existing order of business to secure performance.  Accordingly, we hypothesize the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1: Risk-taking is positively related to business performance. 
Innovativeness represents a bias toward embracing and supporting creativity, 
experimentation, technological leadership, and R&D in the development of products, services, 
and processes to generate novel solutions to customer needs and problems.  It is said to be 
present when firms pursue active implementation of new ideas, products or processes not merely 
their generation (e.g., Hurley and Hult, 1998).  A strong emphasis on innovativeness mobilizes 
entry into new arenas, renews the firm’s presence in existing ones and embodies a capability to 
explore new possibilities (Cho and Pucik, 2005; Garud and Nayyar, 1994; Hult and Ketchen, 
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2001).  As such, innovativeness is a chief means to create differentiation and develop solutions 
that undermine those of competitors. 
Brüdel and Preisendörfer (2000) identified innovation to be the single most important 
firm predictor of firm growth.  Calantone, Çavuşgil, and Zhao (2002) found that firm 
innovativeness has a positive impact on performance and contributes to competitive advantage 
by facilitating creative thinking within a firm’s learning activities.  Innovativeness also improves 
the application of market intelligence acquired through market orientation activities, which can 
benefit performance (Han, Kim, and Srivastava, 1998; Hurley and Hult, 1998).  Also, Hult, 
Hurley, and Knight (2004) uncovered in their study that innovativeness benefits business 
performance regardless of market turbulence.  Innovativeness changes how a firm applies market 
information (e.g., Slater and Narver, 1995) and together informs the generation of intelligent 
solutions. 
Innovativeness in activities can potentially carry costs however and depends largely on 
commercialization for the success of its outcomes but given that it changes how firms apply 
many of their learning and market mechanisms by establishing new insight and perspective, it is 
likely to contribute to business performance.  Accordingly, the following hypothesis is formed: 
Hypothesis 2: Innovativeness is positively related to business performance. 
Proactiveness represents a forward-looking perspective where firms actively seek to 
anticipate opportunities to develop and introduce new or improved products, instigate changes to 
current strategies and tactics, and detect future trends in the market (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; 
Slater and Narver, 1995).  Its goal is to secure first-mover advantage in the short term and shape 
the direction of the market environment in the long term. 
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Increasing the firm’s receptiveness to market signals and awareness of customers’ needs 
(expressed or latent) are two of the main advantages offered by proactiveness.  Studies have 
reported high performance returns to proactive firms because of their responsiveness to market 
signals (e.g., Day and Wensley, 1988; Wright, Kroll, Pray, and Lado, 1995).  Proactive firms, 
through proprietary learning and experience effects gained over time, tend to be more attuned to 
changes and trends in the marketplace, which yields opportunities to the firm to meet expressed 
and latent needs ahead of competitors (Hamel and Prahalad, 1991).  By actively anticipating and 
preparing for change, proactive firms are in a better position to seize market share and customers 
quickly when change occurs by mobilizing resources far in advance of rivals.  In doing so, the 
proactive firm remains a step ahead of less responsive competitors. 
Proactiveness in firms is characterized by intentional change.  That is, forcibly acting on 
information to make change not merely anticipating it (Bateman and Crant, 1999).  This 
alleviates the risk of complacency by ensuring firms are better placed to serve markets in the 
short term and shape them in the longer term.  The emphasis on anticipating and acting on future 
needs orients the firm to seize initiative and act opportunistically in the marketplace thereby 
shaping demand (Miller and Friesen, 1978; Venkatraman, 1989).  Proactiveness is likely to be 
valuable in securing superior performance returns because it implies customer-centrality given 
the need to understand customers, ascertain and exploit their needs, and actively deconstruct the 
value package of competitors to generate superior offerings. 
By being ‘inert to inertia’, proactive firms can potentially secure valuable performance 
rewards.  The proactive firm adopts continuous environmental scanning and acts in advance of 
change to better serve customers and markets rather than allow its destiny to be guided by 
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external forces.  Proactiveness leverages the firm’s responsiveness capability and propensity to 
act to meet new circumstances.  Accordingly, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 3: Proactiveness is positively related to business performance. 
Competitive aggressiveness encapsulates the intensity of a firm’s efforts to outperform 
and undermine its industry rivals (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001).  It can take the form of deliberate 
action as well as reactive action.  Firms that are highly aggressive see competitors as enemies 
that must be conquered.  Aggressiveness can be implemented through the mobilization of 
resources to launch direct attacks on competitors with the aim of overwhelming their market 
efforts, steadily erode their competitive strengths, or establish advantage through continuous 
offensive tactics (Davidson, 1987).  In contrast to proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness 
mobilizes continuous competitor assessment above environmental assessment so that 
opportunities to exploit the firm’s strengths and competitors’ weaknesses are sought and taken 
advantage of.  The aggressive firm sees value as accruing from leveraging adaptive capabilities 
to consistently undermine competitors’ efforts in the market as opposed to adopting a passive 
stance to competition.  
 The aggressive firm relies on offense as opposed to defense in its approach to 
competition.  Aggressiveness can improve performance because the emphasis on out-doing and 
out-maneuvering competitors strengthens the firm’s competitiveness at the expense of rivals 
(Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  Examples of the manifestation of such an aggressive competitive 
strategy include aggressive price competition, market entry with a new or superior offering, fast-
following a rival into a market, continuously exploiting information, and using unconventional 
surprise tactics.  Such an emphasis on acquiring market share and customers by aggressively 
targeting rivals’ weaknesses should improve performance because it undermines competitors’ 
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ability to compete and restricts the ability of competitors to anticipate and respond to what the 
aggressive firm will do next.  Since the aggressive firm does not sit still and constantly 
implements incremental and adaptive change to undermine competitors, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 4: Competitive aggressiveness is positively related to business performance. 
Autonomy conveys the freedom to employees to encourage them to be self-directed, to 
exercise creativity, pursue opportunities, and champion new ideas which are essential for 
effective entrepreneurial activity to occur (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  This requires policies of 
empowerment, open communication, unrestricted access to information, and authority to think 
and act without interference (Engel, 1970; Spreitzer, 1995). 
By establishing autonomy, managers demonstrate to employees their faith in their ability 
to perform effectively outside the rubric of firm constraints.  Such autonomy then encourages 
employees to participate in change and become actively involved in entrepreneurial activity.  
This is likely to be a critical success factor because all entrepreneurial activity must be 
undertaken by employees.  If employees are constrained in the actions and activities they can 
undertake without managerial consent, entrepreneurial activity is likely to fail and the 
performance of the firm is likely to suffer as employees fail to deviate when necessary from 
established practices or implement change quickly. 
Autonomy is, therefore, an important driver of flexibility, which is an essential attribute if 
a firm is to be able to respond promptly to environmental change and market signals by quickly 
reconfiguring its actions and activities (e.g., Grewal and Tansuhaj, 2001).  Flexibility is created 
when people within the firm are given freedom to apply their human capital in ways that help the 
firm change adaptively and be responsive to the needs of its markets and actions of its rivals.  A 
lack of autonomy would likely result in passivity when change is needed to initiate effective 
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response to opportunities and threats to performance.  The presence of autonomy, in contrast, 
should encourage a greater flexibility in the firm to facilitate active and reactive response to 
change.  Although some framework of coordination is likely to be needed, on balance we expect 
that autonomy will be beneficial to improving business performance.  So, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 5: Autonomy is positively related to business performance. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Data Generation and Sampling Issues 
As explained at the outset, this study examines issues of EO and business performance in 
emerging young firms.  More specifically, we look at emerging young high-technology firms 
because entrepreneurship is a particularly salient issue to these types of firms.  To characterize 
high-technology, we adopted Doran and Gunn’s (2002) definition of high-technology firms.  
These authors define such firms on the following basis; they must: employ highly-skilled 
employees; emphasize research and development; and, utilize new technology rendering existing 
technology vulnerable to obsolete. 
To capture suitable young high-technology firms at an emerging stage of development as 
defined by our research goals, we selected firms located within business incubators.  Extant 
research into business incubation (e.g., Hansen, Chesbrough, Nohria, and Sull, 2000) suggests 
that high-technology incubators will typically host entrepreneurial firms in the sense defined by 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) amongst others.  Within incubators, a firm is surrounded by like-
minded and similarly situated firms which can motivate efforts to be entrepreneurial (Kambil, 
Eselius and Monteiro, 2000).  Incubators also encourage what is perceived as best practice (e.g., 
Rice 2002), which may encourage a firm toward, for example, entrepreneurial activities.  
However, incubation and success is neither inevitable or path dependent.  Performance comes 
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from the practice, actions and activities of the emerging young firm.  Accordingly, adopting such 
a context is suitable to the study of emerging young firms since incubators are a direct sample 
source of emerging young firms and, so far, we have little knowledge on how such firms should 
be entrepreneurial or the value of each EO dimension separately to performance. 
To create a suitable sample, we needed to access high-technology incubating firms 
located in high-technology incubators.  First, a sampling frame was compiled using the United 
Kingdom Business Incubation (UKBI) directory of business incubators then, after screening for 
high-technology oriented incubators, we built a database of the emerging firms within those 
incubators to serve as our sample population.  The Directory was screened for those that could be 
classified as containing high-technology incubating firms.  We found 73% of all incubators to 
meet our high-technology criteria, thus providing a rich sample source.  These incubators hosted 
young firms operating in science, bioscience, technology, and knowledge-based businesses; 
engineering businesses; and computing, IT, and internet-related businesses.  We then generated a 
random sample of 1,000 emerging young high-technology firms from the database of firms we 
had built based on the latter screening.  We emphasize that incubating firms were surveyed, not 
incubators. 
We then considered potential informants in each sampling unit.  For an informant to be 
suitable for the information needs of the study, the informant had to be in a position to provide 
the relevant information in a knowledgeable manner, thus of senior management level.  Although 
firms possess many types of key informants (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson, 1993), top-level 
managers, such as the Managing Director in this case, are the principle source of information 
about strategic processes and are arguably the only source of information about aspects that 
involve the whole of the firm (Norburn, 1989), particularly so in smaller entrepreneurial firms.  
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Such informants are knowledgeable of internal and external issues to the firm, have similar 
responsibilities regardless of firm size or scope (Norburn, 1989), and are in the best position to 
provide key insights into firm practices, processes, and outcomes (Huber and Power, 1985; 
Stubbart, 1989).  Accordingly, given the nature of the constructs and our information needs, it 
was decided that the Managing Director of the emerging young high-technology firms would be 
the most appropriate key informant to provide the information sought. 
To generate data, a mail survey was administered adhering, as far as was feasible, to the 
principles of the Tailored Design Method (Dillman, 2000).  Pre-notification correspondence, 
questionnaire package, and a series of first and second follow-up reminders were sent 
respectively to sampling units.  Good practice recommended by Dillman (2000) concerning 
questionnaire salience, length, return postage, anonymity guarantee, and university sponsorship 
were integrated into survey implementation.  A total of 211 eligible questionnaires were 
received, generating a 21% response rate.  Although our response rate may prima facie appear 
low, it is offset in part by the fact that many potential respondents declined to participate (n = 82) 
for a variety of reasons.  The reasons ranged from, firms having relocated through to the fact the 
Managing Directors of young high-technology firms are extremely busy, a degree of apathy 
toward mail surveys in the U.K., the fact that mail surveys may have become victims of their 
own success such that managers are swamped by them (Ibeh, Brock, and Zhou, 2004), and that 
the perceived length of the instrument relative to perceived completion time may have been 
unfavorable.  However, the response rate remains comparable to those of other studies in this 
area (e.g., Hult and Ketchen, 2001; Hult et al., 2004; Morgan and Strong, 2003) and those found 
in studies of response rates more generally (e.g., Erdogan and Baker, 2002; Greer, 
Chuchinprakarn, and Seshadri, 2000; see also Larson and Chow, 2003). 
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Respondent firms had a median size of 6 full-time employees, an age of 2.5 years, and 
turnover in the previous 12-month period of GBP 400,000.  To test for non-response bias, the 
Armstrong and Overton (1977) extrapolation method was employed, which is the accepted 
method for such a test.  No significant differences, at conventional levels, between early and late 
respondents across the range of measurement scales were evident.  Based on this result, we can 
be reassured that non-response bias does not exist within the data. 
Operationalization and Measurement 
All items used to measure constructs were gauged on seven-point Likert-type scales.  EO 
dimensions and business performance dimensions were measured using statements anchored 
“Strongly disagree” (1) to “Strongly agree” (7).  These measures were mostly sourced from 
previous studies with some modification made following pre-tests.  The work of Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996) was used as a guide in developing scales for EO dimensions.  The risk-taking 
(RISK) measures were sourced from Barringer and Bluedorn (1999), Hornsby, Kuratko, and 
Zahra (2002), and Morgan and Strong (2003), with some items from Hult and Ketchen (2001).  
Innovativeness (INNOV) measures were mostly sourced from the work of Calantone et al. 
(2002).  Proactiveness (PROACTIVE) was derived from the work of Bateman and Crant (1993), 
Hult and Ketchen (2001), and Morgan and Strong (2003).  Competitive aggressiveness 
(COMPAGG) measures were based on those used by Lumpkin and Dess (2001).  The autonomy 
(AUTONOMY) measures were developed from Engel (1970), Hornsby et al. (2002), and 
Spreitzer (1995). 
In examining business performance, we used two dimensions: customer performance and 
product performance.  A firm’s customer performance is usually characterized by customer 
acquisition and customer retention (e.g., Hansotia, 2004; Jayachandran, Sharma, Kaufman, and 
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Raman, 2005; Reinartz, Thomas, and Kumar, 2005; Thomas, 2001).  For emerging young firms 
to survive and prosper, it is imperative that they attract new customers, sustain its existing 
customer base, and achieve repeat orders.  Customer performance (CUSTPERF) measures were 
thus developed based on how effective the firm had been at attracting, retaining and sustaining 
customers and achieving repeated orders.  This was salient because emerging firms must seize 
customers quickly with a sound competitive offering if they are to survive in the short-term and 
develop a platform for future profitability.   
Product performance (PRODPERF) measures were based on the relative success of the 
firm’s products in terms of sales and at achieving market share.  Support for these measures is 
drawn from the new product performance research of Atuahene-Gima and Li (2004), Song and 
Xie (2000), and Wei and Morgan (2004).  Since emerging young firms often base their market 
approach and their success typically on one core product offering, it was sensible to capture the 
relative success of the emerging firm’s products at securing sales and market share compared to 
competitors as these dimensions capture the two key areas in which emerging young firms must 
make an impact if they are to survive and prosper. 
To ensure face and content validity, the questionnaire was subjected to review and finally 
pre-tested with a number of expert judges consisting of academicians, managers, and field 
experts.  Various alterations were made to the items.  The items we used to capture each 
construct can be found in the Appendix.  Summated scales were constructed for each construct.  
To test for reliability, Cronbach alpha coefficients were calculated for each scale, all of which 
successfully satisfied Nunnally’s (1978) threshold level of reliability with alpha coefficients of 
0.70 or greater in each case (Table 1).  The validity of each scale was gauged by item-total 
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correlation analyses (Appendix).  All item-total correlation coefficients were found to be 
acceptably high, in the anticipated direction, and statistically significant (p ≤ .001). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
 Table 1 contains a correlation matrix of all the constructs to illustrate inter-relationships 
among these constructs.  Initial inspection of the correlation matrix suggests that mixed support 
exists for our hypotheses that the five EO dimensions contribute to business performance.  
Innovativeness and proactiveness are both correlated with product performance and customer 
performance.  However, the remaining three EO dimensions show no correlation with either 
performance dimension.  This finding is important because it signals that, at an emerging stage 
of development, not all EO dimensions are equally or necessarily associated with business 
performance.  This supports the words of Lumpkin and Dess (1996) who cautioned that each 
dimension of EO may not necessarily be equally valuable or desirable to improve business 
performance at different stages of firm development.  Our findings signal that adopting a gestalt 
approach to the study of EO potentially masks weaknesses in its real value to firms.  Moreover, 
firms need not necessarily pursue all EO dimensions and cannot expect each dimension to be 
necessarily associated with improved performance.  Nevertheless, these are only bivariate 
relationships.  Multiple regression analyses were performed to further test hypotheses and these 
results are contained within Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The results in Table 2 are presented in terms of the relation of each EO dimension to each 
dimension of business performance.  Each regression model possesses statistically significant F-
test scores and so we can be confident that the models possess good explanatory power.  We 
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tested the variance inflation factor and condition index statistics and found that multicollinearity 
was not an issue in the data since they were within tolerable limits set out by Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, and Black (1998).  The variance inflation factor statistics ranged between 1.00 and 1.58 
(< 10, Hair et al., 1998).  The condition index statistics peaked at 23.55 (< 30, Hair et al., 1998).  
Confidence in the regression tests that follow is therefore provided by these statistics. 
The regression results indicate that the relationship between EO and performance is 
complex.  Hypothesis 3, which predicted a positive relationship between proactiveness and 
performance, is supported on both performance dimensions.  Proactiveness is the only EO 
dimension to be related to improvements in both product performance (β = 0.23, p < 0.01) and 
customer performance (β = 0.35, p < 0.01).  Therefore, it must form a central component of an 
emerging young firm’s entrepreneurial strategy.  Hypothesis 2 is somewhat supported in that 
innovativeness is positively related to product performance (β = 0.16, p < 0.1) but not customer 
performance.  This confirms Lumpkin and Dess’ (1996) suspicion that on different performance 
metrics, EO dimensions may yield different outcomes.  Hypothesis 1 (risk-taking) is refuted on 
the product performance dimension (β = -0.14, p < 0.1) which demonstrates that each dimensions 
might not necessarily be desirable in pursuing improved performance.  Hypotheses 4 and 5 
attract no support on either performance dimension and serve to reinforce the concerns raised at 
the beginning of this paper that each EO dimension, under certain circumstances, may not be of 
any use in trying to secure superior performance. 
We find little evidence, therefore, to support the widely held belief that EO is universally 
beneficial for business performance.  Indeed, our findings illustrate that adopting a gestalt 
approach to examining EO masks the fact that performance improvements might be the product 
of only one or two of its five dimensions and that its remaining components are either of no 
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value or even work against initiatives to improve performance.  At an embryonic stage of 
development, therefore, firms need to take a cautious approach to implementing EO as all its 
dimensions do not guarantee improved performance.  Our research therefore goes some way to 
explaining contradictions found in research that have examined the EO–performance 
relationship.  First, contradictions might be a product of firms being examined at different stages 
of development thus facing different conditions and needs.  Second, contradictions might result 
from the gestalt study of EO whereby only one or a combination of strong dimensions exhibit 
performance outcomes (thereby inflating the strength of the overall EO construct) or show very 
little cumulative impact (thereby deflating any influence by a valuable component).  Our findings 
caution managers and researchers from assuming that each dimension is equally valuable or 
universally valid in studying business performance. 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, & LIMITATIONS 
 Through this study, we sought to explore whether each dimension of EO, as 
conceptualized by Lumpkin and Dess (1996), was equally valuable in securing improved 
performance.  Specifically, we aimed to address a central caveat in Lumpkin and Dess’ (1996) 
seminal work that, potentially, these dimensions might have no or even a negative relationship 
with performance depending on different circumstances.  In this regard, we wanted to rectify 
glaring omissions in the study of EO.  To our knowledge, this is the first study of its kind to 
consider all five dimensions of EO on business performance independently without adopting a 
gestalt approach to measuring EO and is the first to examine firms at a specific stage of 
development, in this case at an embryonic stage of development. 
 It is interesting that emerging young firms, which could be thought of as inherently 
entrepreneurial, struggle to achieve strong business performance and their use of an EO may 
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actually be contributing to this difficulty.  Liabilities of newness may explain why this occurs.  
With weak resource and knowledge endowments, these firms may be unable to make full and 
effective use of an EO, which is resource intensive when implemented in full.  An examination 
of frequencies reveals that firms in our sample make relatively intensive use of each EO 
dimension.  On the 7-point scale employed, the mean of risk-taking (5.05), innovativeness 
(5.65), proactiveness (5.33), competitive aggressiveness (4.74), and autonomy (5.65) were all 
relatively strong across the sample which shows that the issue of EO is highly pertinent.  
However, this equally demonstrates a misapplication of resources since the findings show that 
performance implications vary significantly.  Emerging young firms therefore must tread 
carefully and apply EO strategically to ensure each feature contributes to performance and adds 
value to the firm.  An ad hoc approach to the implementation of EO is potentially damaging 
since it unwittingly leads to a waste of resources and consequently leads to an unintended 
strategic decision to undermine the firm’s performance. 
Our results demonstrate that, at this particular stage of development, proactiveness and 
innovativeness are the primary features of an EO responsible for improving business 
performance.  Risk taking negatively influences product performance and competitive 
aggressiveness and autonomy indicate no influence whatsoever on either business performance 
dimension.  When EO is deconstructed into its five component dimensions, it becomes clear that 
each dimension is not equally valuable to performance at an embryonic stage of development. 
A primary research question that emerges is at which stages of development do the other 
dimensions of EO become valuable.  Intuitively, they might benefit performance at a later stage 
because they encourage firms to avoid inertia when fast growth plateaus.  However, there are 
costs to risk-taking and aggressiveness too—typically from competitor responses—and 
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autonomy might lead to drift and resource wastage if there is no coordinating mechanism in 
place to inform the direction of autonomous behavior.  Surprisingly, little research exists into the 
potential costs of EO dimensions as the tendency has been to assume a unilateral positive 
relationship with performance.  Research into EO would therefore benefit from exploring 
indirect relationships as well as testing its own assumptions further.  Nevertheless, our findings 
help shed light on how EO might contribute to advantage and we caution researchers and 
managers alike to examine EO with great care and assess objectively whether its dimensions add 
or detract from value in the firm. 
Conclusions 
The findings indicate that uniform effort in all EO dimensions does not generate 
consistent gains in business performance.  However, we can construe from these results that 
higher levels of proactiveness and innovativeness are correspondingly associated with higher 
levels of performance in emerging young firms.  The relationship between EO and performance 
is more complex than is often portrayed and we contend that collectively EO dimensions have 
seemingly little direct influence on business performance.  We thereby join a growing list of 
studies that have come to a similar conclusion (e.g., Matsuno et al., 2002; Morgan and Strong, 
2003).  It is a research priority to understand why such marked differences have been reported. 
Our results might be explained by the fact we examined firms at an embryonic stage of 
development.  For such firms, organizing activities around proactiveness, and to some extent 
innovativeness, is essential to securing improved performance.  Proactiveness encourages the 
firm to anticipate and act in advance of market change which allows the firm to manage its 
market and shape the direction of competition over time.  Innovativeness then orients the firm to 
generate novel competitive offerings to meet market needs identified through proactive scanning.  
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In conjunction, these two can be powerful processes in the pursuit of performance as the results 
suggest.  For emerging young firms, securing a firm foothold in their chosen marketplace is 
critical to securing longer-term prosperity and these two activities are highly compatible with 
that goal.  Overall, our findings suggest that deploying EO dimensions is not only a matter of 
strategic choice, but the selection of dimensions to be implemented must be based on what is 
beneficial to the strategy pursued and what is appropriate at each stage of development.  The EO 
construct should not be misconstrued as a pathway to advantage since we show that not each 
dimension is of value.  However, if it is applied strategically and selectively it would appear to 
be beneficial to the emerging young firm. 
Implications for Managers and Practitioners 
Managers should revisit their EO capabilities and audit whether these are delivering 
value.  This will require a review of polices and procedures in addition to benchmarking these 
activities to identify whether the firm is dedicating an unwarranted and misplaced amount of 
resources to a given EO activity.  A value analysis should be undertaken in light of our findings.  
As Lumpkin and Dess (1996) rightly noted, each dimension can vary independently, indicating 
that firms should manipulate only those that add value, as highlighted in our results. 
The blind pursuit of uniform implementation of EO dimensions is not an effective way 
for firms to create advantage.  Our results suggest that such an attempt would lead to resource 
inefficiencies since not all EO dimensions are necessarily beneficial.  Firms should focus on 
practices of proactiveness and innovativeness as well as ensuring that risk-taking does not 
become a hindrance to performance.  This does not mean a return to bureaucratic formalization 
of firms, but, restraint is needed in the application of EO dimensions. 
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The key activity for firms is proactiveness given its universal positive influence on both 
performance metrics.  Managers therefore need to ensure that their firms are highly proactive.  
This will likely require a review and revision of existing practices and activities within the firm.  
Proactiveness can be improved through the implementation of environmental scanning 
techniques, a means by which managers can learn about events and trends in the firm’s 
environment, which ultimately aids market opportunity recognition (Hambrick, 1981) so that the 
firm can generate a step-ahead advantage in meeting expressed and latent needs.  Market signal 
detection and discriminating between opportunities and threats should be the responsibility of all 
employees, underlining the importance of connecting entrepreneurial efforts to marketing efforts 
(e.g., Atuahene-Gima and Ko, 2001; Bhuian, Menguc and Bell, 2005; Matsuno et al., 2002; 
Slater and Narver, 1995).  Ensuring adequate involvement and participation in the firm’s selected 
EO activities is essential to this.  Other schemes to improve proactiveness include encouraging 
the use of initiative and allowing improvisation.  Such flexible, initiative-led behavior will help 
the firm shape market direction rather than be governed by it.  Also, as suggested by our results, 
proactiveness should be complemented by innovativeness given that it correlated with 
performance.  Thus, creativity initiatives should also receive management attention and 
employees should be encouraged to solve market problems in novel ways so that the emerging 
young firm has a basis to better meet needs and differentiate from rivals. 
Effective adoption and execution of proactiveness and innovativeness is likely to require 
an investment in human capital.  Since it is the responsibility of people within the firm to execute 
proactiveness and innovativeness in its daily routines and marketing efforts, managers should 
consider what education or skills training might assist employees to perform these activities 
better.  Strong human capital is needed to lever the ability of the firm as a whole to perform 
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certain activities to a superior level relative to competitors (Hitt and Ireland, 2002).  An 
investment in human capital to leverage the application of proactiveness and innovativeness will 
aid their performance impact.  This corresponds to the views of Bateman and Crant (1993) 
regarding the role of employees in proactive firm behavior. 
A further implication of our findings is that managers should be mindful in undertaking 
risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness, or autonomy and consider cautiously whether these are 
worthwhile at an early stage of development.  Our results suggest they contribute no direct value 
to performance.  Risk-taking is considered a defining characteristic of being entrepreneurial.  
However, we find no evidence that adopting a risk-taking approach to business is beneficial.  On 
the contrary, it would appear to hinder performance.  Managers of emerging young firms should 
consider moving away from treating EO as a cumulative construct and instead focus on its value-
adding dimensions to improve performance. 
Limitations 
First, our study concentrated on emerging young high-technology firms in the U.K.  
Caution should therefore be exercised in generalizing these findings to non-comparable 
populations.  Consequently, future studies might want to consider the implications of our work 
for different populations of firms.  Second, we adopted a cross-sectional design but this has the 
effect of constraining the strength of the causal inferences we can make.  A study using a 
longitudinal design might help to elucidate the findings further, particularly to see whether the 
effect of different EO dimensions change over time as the firm moves into different stages of 
development. 
Future Research 
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Our results do not bear out the notion that EO is uniformly beneficial for business 
performance.  Much further research is needed to identify the causes of anomalies in the EO–
performance relationship.  The fact that several studies have now found little or no relationship 
suggests further investigation of this relationship is necessary.  In this study, we deconstructed 
EO into its dimensions and studied these on performance.  We also examined specifically firms 
at an embryonic stage of development.  We provide support for concerns raised by Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996) that at different stages of development and on different performance metrics, each 
EO dimension may not be equally valuable or necessary.  We therefore extend prior research and 
fill several omissions in EO research. 
Questions still remain however.  First, at what point in time or in the evolution of firms 
do other dimensions of EO become important or less important?  We suggest that much more 
research is needed to explore EO at different stages of development to appreciate why 
inconsistencies have been reported in the relationship between EO and performance.  An 
effective EO strategy cannot remain static and so this is a key issue requiring urgent research.  
Second, is there an interaction among the EO dimensions that somehow levers performance 
indirectly?  We have not considered the possibility that specific EO dimension might leverage 
others.  Correlations reported in Table 1 suggest that some interaction among the dimension 
might true yet existing research has not tackled this issue.  Third, do EO dimension indirectly 
influence business performance through some other mechanism?  Some recent studies have 
considered whether EO indirectly influences business performance through market orientation 
(e.g., Atuahene-Gima and Ko, 2001; Bhuian et al., 2005; Matsuno et al., 2002) and results have 
been mixed.  Research is needed to examine whether there is a stronger case for an indirect 
relationship than a direct one and what constructs might mediate that relationship. 
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Further research is also needed to understand how different EO dimensions might 
influence other aspects of business development, marketing success, and business process 
outcomes above and beyond simply business performance.  This is necessary to identify whether 
the strategic selection issue identified in this study extends more broadly to other outcomes as 
well.  Firms and their managers need more information on whether different EO dimensions 
have differential weights on other dimensions of firm success.  So far, a uniform approach has 
tended to prevail, promoting unquestionably the EO of firms.  Nonetheless, as the findings of this 
study show, there are selective triggers which lead to specific outcomes.  Consequently, more 
research is needed to understand the configuration of EO most suited to achieving different 
outcomes. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Measures and Items Used 
  
Scale composition Item-total 
scale 
correlation a 
Entrepreneurial Orientation:  
Risk-taking (RISK)  
The term ‘risk taker’ is considered a positive attribute for people in our business 0.87 
People in our business are encouraged to take calculated risks with new ideas 0.83 
Our business emphasizes both exploration and experimentation for opportunities 0.76 
Innovativeness (INNOV)  
We actively introduce improvements and innovations in our business 0.87 
Our business is creative in its methods of operation 0.86 
Our business seeks out new ways to do things 0.83 
Proactiveness (PROACTIVE)  
We always try to take the initiative in every situation (e.g., against competitors, in 
projects and when working with others) 0.82 
We excel at identifying opportunities 0.82 
We initiate actions to which other organizations respond 0.82 
Competitive aggressiveness (COMPAGGR)  
Our business is intensely competitive 0.81 
In general, our business takes a bold or aggressive approach when competing 0.83 
We try to undo and out-maneuver the competition as best as we can 0.81 
Autonomy (AUTONOMY)  
Employees are permitted to act and think without interference 0.80 
Employees perform jobs that allow them to make and instigate changes in the way 
they perform their work tasks 0.83 
Employees are given freedom and independence to decide on their own how to go 
about doing their work 0.79 
Employees are given freedom to communicate without interference 0.74 
Employees are given authority and responsibility to act alone if they think it to be in 
the best interests of the business 0.75 
Employees have access to all vital information 0.69 
  
Business Performance:  
Product performance (PRODPERF)  
Relative to competing products, those of our business have been more successful in 
terms of sales 0.98 
Relative to competing products, those of our business have been more successful in 
terms of achieving and establishing market share 0.98 
Customer performance (CUSTPERF)  
We have been able to attract totally new customers this year 0.90 
We have been able to expand our existing customer base this year 0.90 
We have succeeded in sustaining our customer base and achieving repeat orders 0.79 
  
a Pearson Correlation Coefficients.  All correlations are significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed). 
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  Table 1 – Scale Properties, Descriptive Statistics, and Correlation Matrix of Constructs 
 
Scale label Mean 
(S.D.) 
 
  PRODPERF CUSTPERF RISK INNOV PROACTIVE COMPAGGR AUTONOMY 
         
PRODPERF 4.31 (1.41) 0.96       
CUSTPERF 5.44 (1.18) 0.55** 0.83      
RISK 5.05 (1.02) 0.03 0.09 0.77     
INNOV 5.65 (0.97) 0.20** 0.16* 0.52** 0.81    
PROACTIVE 5.33 (0.94) 0.28** 0.36** 0.27** 0.41** 0.75   
COMPAGGR 4.74 (1.32) 0.03 0.01 0.15* 0.11 0.07 0.75  
AUTONOMY 5.46 (1.02) 0.10 0.08 0.30** 0.27** 0.10 -0.01 0.86 
         
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
Note:  Cronbach Alphas are shown on the diagonal of the correlation matrix in italics. 
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Table 2 – Multiple Regression Analysis Results 
      
Model Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
Model properties Standardized regression 
coefficient (β) 
t-value 
      
Model 1 PRODPERF RISK R2 = 0.10 -0.14 -1.69† 
  INNOV F-value = 4.32** 0.16 1.89† 
  PROACTIVE  0.23 3.14** 
  COMPAGGR  0.02 0.30 
  AUTONOMY  0.07 0.95 
  Intercept   1.98** 
      
Model 2 CUSTPERF RISK R2 = 0.13 -0.02 -0.31 
  INNOV F-value = 6.08** 0.02 0.22 
  PROACTIVE  0.35 4.89** 
  COMPAGGR  -0.01 -0.19 
  AUTONOMY  0.05 0.73 
  Intercept   4.38** 
      
PRODPERF Product performance;  CUSTPERF Customer performance;  RISK; Risk-taking; INNOV Innovativeness; PROACTIVE Proactiveness; 
COMPAGGR Competitive aggressiveness; AUTONOMY Autonomy 
** p ≤ 0.01; * p ≤ 0.05; † p ≤ 0.1 
 
 
